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NOTES AND COMMENT
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR BROKER'S COMMISSION WHEN
PURCHASER DEFAULTS
I
No phase of the law is static. Constantly it must meet and solve
new problems. It is just such an evolution we wish here to consider
as to its justification and probable effect upon the commercial law
of brokerage. To do so efficiently we must pause a moment in order
to refamiliarize ourselves with some basic concepts of the law of
contracts in this field.
II
A close inspection of any exposition of the rules governing
brokerage will quickly disclose that many of the rules were born as a
result of litigation involving real estate transactions. Therefore, in
our development, we will borrow heavily from that phase of the law.
Generally the rules are capable of transition and such a treatment
will provide a correct brokerage background for any type of broker.
A broker, as any agent, is entitled under certain conditions to
compensation. This right to payment is a matter of contract,1 either
express or implied. If implied the compensation may be determined
by the local usage prevailing in similar circumstances,2 but usage
will not be permitted to contravene an express agreement.3 In the
absence of both agreement and usage, the broker will be entitled to a
reasonable compensation. 4 However, it is always competent for the
parties to agree upon the amount of compensation and the terms and
conditions of its payment, and such agreements will be enforced to
the exclusion of all other claims for compensation. 5
Initially it was stated that a broker is entitled to compensation
under certain conditions according to the provisions of his contract.
The broker must show that he has completed his undertaking accord-
ing to its terms, or that completion was prevented by the unlawful
acts of his principal6 He is never entitled to compensation for un-
I Clark v. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 329 Pa. 421, 193 At. 36(1938).
2 Groscup v. Downey, 105 Md. 273, 65 At]. 930 (1907).
3 Sanford v. Rawlings, 43 Ill. 92 (1867).4 Hollis v. Weston, 156 Mass. 357, 31 N. E. 483 (1892).
5 McDonald v. Ortmann, 98 Mich. 40, 56 N. W. 1055 (1893).6 2 MECHEM, AGENCY § 2427 (2d ed. 1914).
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successful efforts. 7 A real estate broker properly authorized to sell
property has performed his contract when he has produced a pur-
chaser ready, willing and able to purchase upon the terms specified.8
If the principal has permitted a modification of those terms the
broker is still entitled to his commissions.9
As to just what constitutes ability to perform involves various
factors and usually is adjudicated in the light of the particular cir-
cumstances. Usually the proposed purchaser must have legal capacity
and sufficient financial ability.10 Ordinarily at this point the broker's
task is complete when he has brought the parties together and his
principal has secured a binding contract." However, this rule will
give way in the event that the parties have expressly stipulated to
the contrary by providing other supplementary conditions which must
be met.' 2
Assuming the absence of these conditions most, but not all, jur-
isdictions will assert the right of the broker to his commission with-
out regard to the ultimate consummation of the contract. While there
are some decisions to the effect that there must be actual performance
before commissions accrue, even though the contract of employment
did not cover the point, the great weight of authority is that unless
the broker and his employer have expressly stipulated to the contrary,
the broker is entitled to his compensation upon completion of the
negotiations. And this, irrespective of whether the contract nego-
tiated is ever consummated, as long as the failure of the consumma-
tion is not due to any failure, fraud or bad faith upon the part of the
broker. It will be noted that whether the buyer or the principal or
both default, the broker still has earned his commission. This rule
of ignoring consummation as a factor is not as harsh as it appears
when viewed with the thought that the principal has the privilege
of either rejecting the prospective customer before contracting with
him or as an alternative, investigating the customer's capacity
beforehand.' 3
Where special conditions exist-and these are neither more nor
less than contract terms-such conditions have consistently been
strictly interpreted, which is the usual procedure in the law of con-
tracts; and the failure of the purchaser to carry out his contract has
frequently been fatal to the agent's efforts to recover commissions
78 AM. JUR., Brokers § 168 (1937).
8 Saum v. Capital Realty Development Corp., 268 N. Y. 335, 197 N. E.
303 (1935).
9 Ibid.
10 Reynor v. Mackrill, 181 Iowa 210, 164 N. W. 335 (1917).
11 Clapham v. Cosgrove, 237 App. Div. 901, 261 N. Y. Supp. 819 (2d Dep't
1933).
12 Fittechauer v. Van Wyck, 92 N. Y. Supp. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1905).
13 See 8 Am. JUR. Brokers § 179 (1937). The minority view holding that
consummation is a condition precedent is gradually drifting towards obsolescence.
New York supports the majority view. Clapham v. Cosgrove, 237 App. Div.
901, 261 N. Y. Supp. 819 (2d Dep't 1933).
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under a special contract containing conditions beyond that implied by
the ordinary broker's contract. Some conditions rigidly enforced in
the past required: consummation of the sale; payment in full; or the
sale being fully carried out according to the terms of a contract, etc. 14
A search of these decisions reveals that the factor of net profit or
loss to the principal was not considered as an element to be weighed
in the balance.
So far we have briefly classified a broker's manner of employ-
ment into two general types based on the existence of either an im-
plied or an express contract of employment. We have further dem-
onstrated that if the type be the former, general, but well defined
rules of agency exist, while if it be the latter, the well charted law of
contracts must apply. As might be expected, though, men and their
problems often refuse to be so sharply categorized. It is just such
an obscure or rather novel situation we will now consider.
III
When the Appellate Division recently handed down its deci-
sion in Kane v. Neptune Shipping, Ltda.,15 the court very prob-
ably arrived at a most just conclusion. Nevertheless by a curious
and not infrequent paradox of the law, justice and correct law are
not always concomitant; as the existence of equity will confirm. Yet
dubious legal reasoning no matter how justifiable the immediate end.
must usually be deplored, for under our system of judicial prece-
dents the improperly contrived cure for one ill may well be the germ
of a hundred successive ills.
Furthermore this same system of judicial precedents in the hands
of those to whom dogma is sacrosanct, can become an iron hand about
the throat of vital progress. The conclusions of today while indi-
cated by the decisions of the past must always be made in the light
of present circumstances. In the event these circumstances dictate
a departure from old patterns the departure should be made openly,
supported by attendant logic; not presented secretly, weakly sup-
ported by lip service to case history. Kane v. Neptune seems to rep-
resent a forward stride in the development of brokerage law. An
everyday commercial law problem, it nevertheless contains hidden,
deep running currents of conflicting ideologies. Its conclusion though
justified and courageous was born somewhat obscurely.
The Kane case was an action at law for the recovery of a ship
broker's commission. The facts were not disputed. J. S. Gessel the
plaintiff's assignor was a ship broker in Houston, Texas. Neptune
Shipping, Ltda., the defendant was the time chartered owner of a
Norwegian tanker the Mosli. On October 5, 1938, at Oslo, Norway,
a charter party was arranged between the defendant and Eastern
'U See Note, 51 A. L. R. 1390, 1400 (1927).
Is 274 App. Div. 28, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 396 (1st Dep't 1948).
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States Petroleum Sales Corporation as charterer for a twelve months'
period beginning upon delivery of the vessel. Payment was to be
made in cash, monthly in advance, in New York. The charter in-
cluded among its terms one which permitted Neptune to withdraw
the Mosli in event of a default, without prejudice to any claims to
which Neptune may be entitled under the charter. No reference was
made in the charter to the broker's commissions. However, defen-
dant Neptune agreed by letter to pay Gessel 3y2% brokerage com-
mission on the hire to be earned under the Oslo charter.
A month later on November 5, 1938, Eastern States, the char-
terer, entered into a subcharter agreement with Distribuidora de
Petroleas Mexicanos providing for exactly the same term but at a
10% higher rate. This charter known as the Houston Charter was
permissible under the terms of the Oslo Charter. The vessel was
delivered to Eastern States and then immediately to Distribuidora on
November 28, 1938.
Despite the fact that monthly payments by Eastern States were
consistently late the broker was paid commissions on the first six
months of the charter. Prior to May 20, 1939, defendant dissatisfied
with the dilatory tactics of Eastern States notified them that it was
going to exercise its right to withdraw the tanker from the charter
arrangement. On May 20, 1939, defendant and charterer in good
faith but without the knowledge of the broker entered into an agree-
ment whereby Eastern States assigned to Neptune all its right, title
and interest in the Houston Charter, thereby making Distribuidora
the charterer directly from Neptune. Eastern States guaranteed to
Neptune the faithful performance of the contract by Distribuidora and
in the event of default, undertook to remain fully responsible there-
for. Eastern States further warranted that there were no brokerage
commissions due under the Houston Charter. Finally the assignment
provided as follows: "The time charter dated at Oslo, Norway,
October 5, 1938, between Neptune . . . . as time chartered owner
of the motor tank ship Mosli, and Eastern States Petroleum Co., Inc.,
as time charterer, is hereby cancelled, the intent of this agreement
being that the time charter dated at Houston, Texas, November 5,
1938, between Eastern States .... as sub-time chartered owner and
Distribuidora .... is in all respects to replace and substitute for the
time charter dated at Oslo, Norway, October 5, 1938." 16 The ele-
ment of fraud or bad faith is concededly not present. Judgment is
sought for brokerage commissions on the last six months of the term.
In deciding for the broker the majoriy opinion reached its far
seeing conclusion by a consideration of eight cases all of which are
imperfectly analogous to the instant case.17 Throughout these eight
cases ran one weak but consistent thread, and this thread was the
16 Id. at 30, 79 N. Y. S. 2d at 398.
17 The court stated no case squarely in point had been brought to its
attention.
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key to. decision not in the eight cases but in the ninth, the one under
discussion. The court noticed in its study that in every instance
where the broker failed to recover his commissions the principal was
not in as satisfactory a position as he would have been had there
been no default. Conversely where there was a recovery the prin-
cipal had been substantially made whole. From this tenuous thread
it reasoned it was justified by precedent as well as by the equities
involved in permitting the broker in the Kane case to recover com-
missions upon the hire earned under the Houston charter even though
his contract read that they were to be paid on hire earned under the
Oslo Charter.
The first of the cases presented for consideration in its opinion
was Herschfield v. Jamaica Savings Bank 18 in which a broker was
awarded commissions after his principal had successfully settled a
suit for specific performance. The-trial court found that the defen-
dant had obtained by law a performance of the contract. So too in
Haber v, Goldberg 19 and Dermody v. New Jersey Realties, Inc.,20
the broker was permitted recovery. In all these cases the buyer de-
faulted and the principal was able to recoup either by way of a suit
for specific performance or a settlement for substantial damages so
that the principal was relatively in the same position, as if there had
been no default. Before distinguishing these cases let us mention
one other which refers to and approves of the last two mentioned.
In Anies v. Wesnofske 21 a broker attempted to recover commissions
on a defaulted contract for the purchase of real estate. As a settle-
ment the vendor kept a $10,000 down payment and released the buyer
from further obligation. The contract with the broker provided for
his payment "on the closing of title," which condition was not ful-
filled. Refusing to permit recovery the court based its decision
mainly on the theory that the express contract condition had not
been fulfilled nor had any waiver of this condition been shown. They
did not advance as their reason for this decision the view that the
principal had not been made whole. Whether or not $10,000 plus
retention of the property made him whole was not decided by the
case though it would appear on the surface a profitable transaction.
As to the Haber and Dermody cases the court felt it could distin-
guish them, though in the event this was not successful they ended
by denying the theory of these cases. This attempt to distinguish
was quoted in the Kane case by the court, and appears below with,
however, the addition of the last sentence which the court omitted:
The decisions in Haber v. Goldberg (... ) and Dermody v. New Jersey
Realties, Inc. (... ) are not necessarily at variance with the decisions cited. In
the first case the vendor sued the vendee and obtained damages for non-
28 257 App. Div. 991, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 643 (2d Dep't 1939).
1 992 N. J. Law 367, 105 Atl. 874 (1918).
20 101 N. J. Law 334, 128 At. 265 (1925).
2-1255 N. Y. 156, 174 N. E. 436 (1931).
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performance. In the second case the vendor was not content to accept a for-
feiture, in addition to retaining the down payment made, he exacted and re-
ceived upon a settlement, a substantial sum in lieu of damages. In each case
the vendor made use of the contract, secured for him by his broker, to obtain
an advantage from the defaulting vendee. Although he did not secure actual
performance of the contract, he received, in the one case, an award repre-
senting the benefit lost; in the other, an agreed payment which presumably
measured it with approximate accuracy. It might well have been reasoned
that the precise equivalent of performance was received in each case; there-
fore, that in effect the condition had been performed. However that may be,
the two cases do not derogate from the principle that to establish a waiver by
a vendor of a condition of payment of commission to his broker, viz., that
an actual sale be consummated, there must be a positive act by the vendor
hindering or preventing performance.
2 2
Continuing their argument the court next considered McDowell-
Peternman Co., Inc. v. Independent Packing Co. 23 which presented,
as usual, a broker attempting to recover his commissions after the
buyer had defaulted. The contract of brokerage contained tht. clause
"when goods are shipped" as a condition of payment of commissions.
In addition, this was also the usual custom of the trade. When the
buyer defaulted after a small portion of the goods had been shipped,
the seller went through quite a series of financial maneuvers in order
to salvage the contract. Eventually, however, the buyer was ad-
judged a bankrupt and the default was an accomplished fact, with a
loss to the vendor of over $200,000.
Since he had not paid for the goods title never passed to the
purchaser and his being able to use them as collateral for a loan was
significant not of consummation but only of the generous treatment
of the vendor. Among other pleas plaintiff broker despite the non-
fulfillment of the condition precedent claims commissions on these
financial machinations internal to the ultimate end of the contract. In
rejecting these pleas the court pointed out not only the condition un-
fulfilled but the loss of the principal of over $200,000. The emphatic
language of the court leaves little doubt as to the rule of law for
which it may be cited:
It is very clear that the shipment of the merchandise was a condition
precedent to the earning of brokerage commissions by the plaintiff. Not only
that but the evidence offered by the defendant clearly showed without contra-
diction that such a construction was borne out by the previous dealings be-
tween the parties and by custom of the trade. . . . The contract provides that
commissions were payable "when goods are shipped." There is no allegation
in the complaint or elsewhere, either that shipment was made or that there was
any other arrangement substituted therefor, or to take the place of shipment.
The undoubted construction of the contract is that commissions were not to
be paid until the goods were shipped.
24
22 Id. at 164, 174 N. E. at 440.
23211 App. Div. 781, 208 N. Y. Supp. 341 (1st Dep't 1925).
24 Id. at 789, 208 N. Y. Supp. at 348.
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So too in its discussion of Lougheed & Co., Ltd. v. Suzuki,25 the
court seized upon a collateral fact and ascribed to it a significance
which it did not deserve. Because of a protracted delay in delivering
a vessel, a charterer used his option to cancel the contract of hire.
The delay was due to no fault of defendant. Nevertheless the plain-
tiff sued for his fees on the theory that he had fulfilled his duties
when the valid contract of hire had been formed. Fortunately for
the defendants they had protected themselves against this eventuality
by insisting upon inserting in the brokerage contract, a limitation
upon their liability for fees. This condition that payment was due
to broker "on monthly payment of hire" was the factor upon which
the court decided the case and not because the principal was not made
whole. The opinion didn't mention this theory but expressly predi-
cated their solution on contract grounds when they said:
Finding that plaintiff's right to brokerage extended to monthly hire only,
as paid to defendants, . .. it follows that a verdict should have been directed
in favor of defendants .... 26
Finally the last two cases considered were Caldwell Co., Inc. v.
Connecticut Mills Co.27 and Daly v. Chapman Manufacturing Co. 28
In the former case plaintiff had secured for his principal a huge con-
tract for the purchase of their goods. The buyer defaulted and after
negotiations, vendors agreed to accept a large sum in settlement of
their claims. No brokerage was paid on this sum for under the
terms of the brokerage agreement commissions were to be paid only
on goods shipped from the mill and accepted by the customer. Despite
the large sum paid as damages it was undisputed that on the whole
the defendant suffered a loss when the cost of overhead charges on
his idle plant were considered. The court refused recovery by the
broker, because the condition precedent had not been met. In addi-
tion they substantiated this line of reasoning by refusing to permit a
recovery on an equitable basis since the principal had actually lost
money because of the default. From this negative dictum we find
the court in the Kane case affirmatively deciding that there is an
equitable basis for the decision; and that this basis is the doctrine
of equivalent performance. Such a theory was expressly rejected
by the court in the Caldwell case when they said:
We are not concerned, therefore, with any claim of fraud, nor may we
predicate a judgment upon any general considerations of what would consti-
tute equitable or generous treatment to the plaintiff. This is an action at law
upon a written contract, and that contract is the charter of the plaintiff's rights.
It is quite beside the point for plaintiff to urge that inasmuch as the defendant
25 216 App. Div. 487, 215 N. Y. Supp. 505 (1st Dep't 1926).
2 ,Id. at 494, 215 N. Y. Supp. at 512.
27225 App. Div. 270, 232 N. Y. Supp. 625 (1st Dep't 1929), aff'd, 251 N. Y.
565, 168 N. E. 429 (1929).2s246 Mass. 118, 140 N. E. 677 (1923).
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has received the amount by which it would have profited by performance of
the agreement, it should in good conscience pay the plaintiff what it would
have to pay him upon performance by the Fisk Rubber Company. Indeed the
premise that it has received the equivalent of its legal damages is effectively
challenged by the appellant. Even if that challenge is unsuccessful, however,
it was still jerfectly competent for these parties to contract that in no event
should commissions be payable except upon the price of goods actually
shipped.29
Any lingering doubt as to the opinion of the Court of Appeals
upon this subject is inevitably dissipated when after a review of sev-
eral somewhat analogous cases,30 they summed up by saying:
It is clear from these authorities that the plaintiff cannot rest upon the
proposition that it is entitled to recover merely because the defendant has
secured a benefit equivalent to performance of the contract. 31
Lastly cited by the court in the Kane decision was the case of
Daly v. Chapman.32  It differs little from the Caldwell case as to
the fact situation but in refusing the plaintiff his commissions on the
ground of failure of a condition precedent the court did mention more
positively and more favorably the latent equitable factors influencing
its decision. As in the Caldwell case upon the purchaser's default a
settlement was made in which the vendor recovered a sum equal to
that profit which would have been realized on the contract. Upon
first glance this would appear to have left the manufacturer whole,
yet because a condition precedent concerning delivery of goods was
not fulfilled, permit him to escape liability for commissions. How-
ever, as it was pointed out in the Kane case, the manufacturer in
vainly trying to keep his concern in business after the default con-
tinued to pay overhead charges and eventually wound up suffering
substantial losses. Just how much of a part this equitable factor
played in influencing the decision is problematical. But it must be
admitted that while the case was ultimately decided on the obvious
meaning of the contract terms, the court did ascribe more significance
to equitable factors than any cases heretofore discussed.
IV
This then was the conventional approach to what constituted in
the final analysis an unconventional solution. At best the thin con-
29 See note 27 supra at 273, 232 N. Y. Supp. at 628.3o Lougheed & Co., Ltd. v. Suzuki, 216 App. Div. 487, 215 N. Y. Supp.
505 (1st Dep't 1926) ; McDowell-Peterman Co. v. Independent Packing Co.,
211 App. Div. 781, 208 N. Y. Supp. 341 (1st Dep't 1925); Watson v. Muske-
gon Steamship Corp., 208 App. Div. 158, 203 N. Y. Supp. 194 (Ist Dep't
1924); Fuller v. Bradley Contracting Co., 183 App. Div. 6, 170 N. Y. Supp.
320 (2d Dep't 1918).
31 See note 27 supra at 278, 232 N. Y. Supp. at 634.
32 See note 28 supra.
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necting thread which linked these cases lends only weak persuasive
weight to the conclusion. At worst the cases deny the conclusion
affirming as they do the view that contract law should be applied
and that equitable factors play no part.
However, as the court pointed out no case exactly in point had
been brought to their attention. Unfettered as they were then by
exact precedents they were comparatively free to create new law.
This they did and probably, most justifiably. To carp then at the
manner of their development while agreeing with their conclusion
seems somewhat pointless until one realizes that the decision in solv-
ing one problem has revived and created several others.
The obscurity of the decision is at once apparent when one at-
tempts to state the principle for which the case stands. A broker is
entitled to recover commissions despite failure of a condition prece-
dent when the principle secures equivalent performance from one
other than the broker procured defaulting vendee. What does this
mean? Does it destroy the power of individuals to contract between
themselves substituting in its stead not what the parties intended but
rather the test of the principals' ultimate profit or loss? Does it mean
that in all cases where the principal locates a substitute vendee the
broker recovers despite the fact the broker had nothing to do with
procuring the substitute? Or must there be some causal linkage
traceable to the broker? Is this linkage a question of fact to be ascer-
tained in the light of individual circumstances? Since the opinion
doesn't mention them, can we assume that all distinction between
Law and Equity have been abolished? Was this decision based on
legal or equitable grounds? Will this case bear citing for situations
other than the present one?
Before attempting to postulate answers to these questions it is
necessary to mention two possible theories upon which the court
predicated its solution. Assuming (the language of the decision
hardly permits it) the court treated the problem as one of law they
may have reasoned thusly. The Neptune people in permitting the
substitution of charterers while retaining all their remedies against
the original charterer have so conducted themselves with the aid of
the contract their broker procured that they are deemed to have
waived the condition precedent. This is in line with the two New
Jersey cases mentioned earlier.3 3 But to so assume makes pointless
the exhaustive search for equitable factors. Nor does it explain the
strong contrary statement in the Amies case.3 4 Still another pos-
sible rationale might be found in the old equitable principle that
"Equity distinguishes between those terms and stipulations which
are of the essence, and those which are not, and does not permit the
defendant to set up the breach of the latter as complete bar to all
s See notes 19 and 20 supra.34 Supra text p. 73.
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relief. . . ." 35 Before applying this principle, however, they would
first have had to decide that the condition precedent was not of the
essence. In the present case such a conclusion would be far-fetched
for the condition is unambiguous and has no good reason for its in-
sertion except to limit the defendant's liability. To disregard this
considered attempt at self protection 36 because the principal has suf-
fered no loss evidences liberal thinking. This liberality, however, if
not watched closely and applied sparingly can well spell the end of
contract law substituting in its stead a somewhat elastic benevolence.
It is only in an attempt to be thorough that these last two pos-
sible rationales have been mentioned, for though incompletely postu-
lated the decision almost certainly presents a departure from existing
rules. That it did not do so unequivocally was probably the result
of attempting to justify it as an extension of presently existing case
law. In its present state the decision should only be absolutely re-
lied upon as law for precisely similar situations. However, some
practical information as to the state of the law may be deduced from it.
The decision does not change the existing rule that strict con-
tract rules will be enforced where it can be shown that the principal
has suffered a loss. Furthermore, these losses need not be immedi-
ately connected with the issue so long as they are causally linked.
In some cases they may be somewhat obscure, discoverable only
through elaborate cost accounting systems 37 while in others they
may be so remote in time as to include the consequential loss of at-
tempting to remain in business while seeking other customers even
though the defaulter paid in damages the anticipated profits.38 In
some instances this loss becomes difficult of ascertainment when for
example questions of personal preferences not completely reducible
to dollar equivalents, are involved. In this wise it might be inter-
esting to note again that in Amies v. Wesnofske 39 the $10,000 plus
retention of the land did not deter the court in refusing to award
commissions. In the light of the present decision the Amies case
now rests on very shaky ground for should it be decided, and it is
a question of fact, that the vendor bad profited, and he seems to have,
consistency would demand that the decision be reversed.
Basically, of course, the problem is sociological. With the years
has come the wane of rugged individualism and in its stead there has
been an increasing tendency towards paternalism on the part of gov-
35 4 PomERoy, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCF § 1297 (5th ed. 1941).
36 It will be recalled that without this protective clause had the principal
not been able to secure a substitute he would still have had to pay commis-
sions, for in that event, the usual rule that a broker has earned his fees whet.
he procures for his principal a binding contract, would apply.
37 Caldwell Co., Inc. v. Connecticut Mills Co., 225 App. Div. 270, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 625 (lst Dep't 1929), aff'd, 251 N. Y. 565, 168 N. E. 429 (1929).
38 Daly v. Chapman Manufacturing Co., 246 Mass. 118, 140 N. E. 677
(1923).
39 See note 21 supra.
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ernment. This trend has influenced the attitudes of the courts and
nowhere is this more clearly shown than in the choice of language
presenting the Kane majority and minority opinions. The majority
spoke equity, the minority talked law. One looked for an escape from
what was considered a disadvantageous contract, the other stressed
the necessity for exactness and stability in commercial law. Each
possessed merit and had the decision presented its conclusion in a
more exact form so as to allay the fears of the dissent a more ser-
viceable future standard would have resulted. However, in its pres-
ent condition the case will provide just more fuel for the old conflict
of form versus substance, which despite the merger of Law and
Equity under the code pleadings still rears its head from time to
time. While the problem persists and certainly so long as the Kane
case is law an alternative demand for equitable relief (absent in the
instant case) is indicated.
From a less theoretical standpoint there can be little doubt that
the practical result of this decision will be a great increase of cases
of this type. No longer will complainants be deterred from present-
ing what had heretofore seemed hopeless pleas. By the same token,
however, these suits will force the courts to enunciate more defini-
tive limits to this type of relief. In short order then a more concrete
standard should appear. Meanwhile and even after these clarifica-
tions appear much litigation can be avoided by including in all brokers'
contracts clear cut provisions anticipating possible defaults.
HAROLD McCoY.
PRESENT STATUS OF INDUSTRIAL HOMEWORERS AS EMPLOYEES
UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
I. Introduction
During the past few years there has existed a conflict as to the
coverage of certain individuals, such as industrial homeworkers,'
under the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Program of the Social
Security Act.2 This conflict concerned the interpretation and defini-
tion to be given to the word "employee" in said Act, and was finally
settled on June 14, 1948 by Congressional amendment to the Social
Security Act.3 A chronological approach is used herein to show how
the conflict arose over a period of years and how it was settled in
the second session of the 80th Congress.
I See Hearings before Committee on Finance on H. J. R. 296, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 128 (1948).
249 STAT. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§301-1307 (1946).
3 Pub. L. No. 642, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a) (June 14, 1948).
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